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DOCUMENTS AND PAPERS

RELATING TO THE LATE

CAMDEN AND AMBOY RAILROAD ACCIDENT,

AT BURLINGTON, N. J.:

CONTAINING AN ACCOUNT OF THE ACCIDENT; THE VERDICT OF THE CORONER'S
JURY; THE COMPANY'S REPORT; A REVIEW OF THE COMPANY'S
REPORT, BY "A BURLINGTONIAN;" AND THE

CORRESPONDENCE

BETWEEN

COMMODORE R. F. STOCKTON AND C. VAN RENSSELAER, D.D.

PHILADELPHIA:
JOSEPH M. WILSON,
CORNER OF NINTH AND ARCH STS.

1855.

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NOTICE.

The following account of the accident on the Camden and Amboy Railroad is compiled from the *New York Times*, and the *Trenton State Gazette*. The object is simply to crowd into a single page, the *main facts* of the accident, as properly preliminary to what follows in this publication.

ACCOUNT OF A TERRIBLE ACCIDENT ON THE CAMDEN AND AMBOY RAILROAD.

It appears, that the 10 o'clock, A. M., train from Philadelphia, proceeded as usual on the way, until they got about two or three miles above Burlington, N. J., when they discovered the train from New York coming down at full speed. The eastward bound train then attempted to back on to a turnout to let the New York train pass, when the track was crossed by a carriage and two horses, driven by Dr. Heineken, of Columbus, N. J. The horses were caught by the hindmost car, knocked down, and crushed to death. The Doctor was thrown out and made a very narrow escape, the carriage being shivered to pieces. This contact with the horses threw the rear car, now the first advancing one of the train, off the rails. Here it ran for some distance without injury, until the embankment, about five feet high, commenced shelving off. The wheels outside the rail, of course, followed this downward direction, until the car was entirely off the track. The second car was thrown directly across the first, and the third went completely through that, and stopped diagonally across the road. The fourth car followed, and plunged headlong into the third. The way-car was also very much injured, but none of the passengers in it were killed. It is to this remarkable jumbling up of the cars that the enormous loss of life is to be attributed. The major part of the passengers in the rear cars were instantly killed or seriously injured.

The scene that ensued baffles all description. The consternation was so great, that a panic of horror seized on all who survived the awful calamity. About twenty persons were killed, and about twenty wounded most shockingly—some so badly that recovery is almost impossible. That night the remains of the dead were carefully deposited in coffins, furnished by the authorities of Burlington. The spectacle at the Town Hall was of the most painful character, fifteen coffins being arranged around the centre of the room. Almost every house in Burlington contained one or more of the sufferers by this terrible catastrophe. During the entire day that usually quiet town was the scene of the wildest excitement.

Four of the cars were smashed to pieces. In some cases the mutilation was horrible. One man had his arm torn off in a fearful manner. Another had an arm also torn off and thrown some distance up the embankment, and his legs separated from his body, his heart and viscera strewn along the track for a great distance. One or two others were buried in the sand, and others were crushed to death between the sleepers. One man had his scalp taken off; another had his thighs broken. Several others had arms broken and were lacerated and bruised in the most dreadful manner. The women and children on board of the train appear nearly all to have escaped. We have but four or five females reported among the dead.

The killed and wounded are as follows: Died on the spot, 19; at Burlington, 1; at Bordentown, 1; at Philadelphia, 1;—Total, 22. Not likely to live, 1; critical, 3;

left for home, 4 ; doing well at Burlington, 20 ; injured, but returned to their respective homes, 51. Total, killed and wounded, 101.

The total number of passengers on the train is said to be 193 ; so that more than half were either killed or wounded.

Yesterday we visited the scene of carnage. Crowds of workmen were engaged in clearing away the broken fragments of the ruined cars, and searching among the ruins for the numerous valuables of which the concussion had despoiled the ill-fated passengers. Of the four cars thrown off the track, not one is worth repairing—the wreck has been total. We have never witnessed many railroad accidents, but we can hardly conceive of any so overwhelmingly destructive of car-work as this.

The accident occurred a short quarter of a mile above Burlington, at the first road which crosses the track—the same crossing where a man was killed in his wagon, a year or two ago, while attempting to pass the track.

VERDICT OF THE JURY.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, BURLINGTON COUNTY, SS.

An inquisition taken at the City of Burlington, in the County of Burlington aforesaid, begun on the twenty-ninth day of August, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty-five, and continuing from day to day until the fourth day of September in the same year, before SAMUEL W. EARLE, one of the Justices of the Peace in and for the County of Burlington aforesaid, acting as Coroner, upon the view of the bodies of JOHN M. CONNELL, of Wilmington, Delaware ; MARGARET PRESCOTT, of Salem County, New Jersey ; ALEXANDER KELLY, DURAND DE ST. ANDRE, WILSON KENT, GEORGE W. RIDGWAY, MRS. C. M. BARCLAY, EDWARD C. BACON, of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania ; CHARLES H. BOTTOM, of Trenton ; HUGH RUSH, of Georgetown, District of Columbia ; WILLIAM M. BOYCE, EMILY M. BOYCE, and MARY BROWN, of Washington, District of Columbia ; JANE P. LINCOLN, of Elliott's Mills, Maryland ; JACOB HOWARD, of Lebanon, Tennessee ; JOHN DALLAM, THOMAS J. MEREDITH, of Baltimore, Maryland ; HUGHES B. JERVIS, of Newark, Delaware ; JOHN F. GILLESPIE, of Natchez, Mississippi ; and TITUS LOVELAND, of Lacon, Illinois ; then and there lying dead, upon the oaths of JOHN RODGERS, WILLIAM A. ROGERS, ELISHA BELDEN, SETH THOMAS, HAMILTON M'DOWELL, FREDERICK BAINBRIDGE, JOHN LARZELERE, ROBERT T. WILLITS, AMOS HUTCHINS, LEWIS ROTHERMEL, EDWARD VOUTE, SAMUEL EMLY, JOHN MITCHELL, WARDROP J. HALL, RICHARD A. WOOLMAN, and BENNETT FALKINBERG, and upon the solemn affirmations of WILLIAM W. MILLER, BUDD STERLING, and LEWIS C. LEEDS, who did allege that they were conscientious and scrupulous of taking an oath, good and lawful men of said County of Burlington, who, being sworn, affirmed, and charged to inquire, on the part of the State of New Jersey, when, where, how, and after what manner the said JOHN M. CONNELL,

[Here follow the names as above.]

came to their deaths, do say, upon their oaths and affirmations aforesaid, that the said JOHN M. CONNELL,

[Here follow the names as above.]

came to their deaths by the running off from the track, and breaking up of the cars, on the Camden and Amboy Railroad, at a spot in the City of Burlington, between the Assiscunk Creek and the crossing of said Railroad by the River Road, on Wednesday, the 29th day of August, eighteen hundred and fifty-five ; and the Jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths and affirmations aforesaid, do further say, that the immediate cause of the running off of the said cars from the said track, was in consequence of the rear cars of the train, while backing, coming into collision with a pair of horses driven by JOHN F. D. HEINEKEN, the same being attached to a carriage.

And the Jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths and affirmations aforesaid, do further say, that due diligence was not exercised by the driver of said horses.

And the Jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths and affirmations aforesaid, do further say, that the Engineer of the said backing train did not observe the rules of said Camden and Amboy Railroad and Transportation Company, and the laws of the State of New Jersey, in reference to the blowing of the steam-whistle on the engine in approaching and crossing the said River Road.

And the Jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths and affirmations aforesaid, do further say, that the Conductor of the backing train should be, and is exonerated from blame, inasmuch as he is found to have been acting in accordance with the instructions laid down in the "Running Regulations" of the Camden and Amboy and Branch Railroads, No. 3, the same having been issued to take effect on the twentieth day of August, A. D. one thousand eight hundred and fifty-five, and which regulations governed the running of trains of cars upon said Railroad, on the twenty-ninth day of August, eighteen hundred and fifty-five.

And the Jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths and affirmations aforesaid, do further say, that the forward Brakeman on the said backing train, is censurable.

And the Jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths and affirmations aforesaid, do further say, that one of the immediate causes of the said collision, was the carelessness and recklessness of JOHN F. D. HEINEKEN driving his horses on the Railroad track, and attempting to cross the same in close proximity to a backing train of cars.

And the Jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths and affirmations aforesaid, do further say, that another immediate cause of the said collision, was the carelessness and recklessness in which the said train of cars was proceeding backwards at a rate of speed unsafe and imprudent.

And the Jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths and affirmations aforesaid, do further say, that by the "Running Regulations" issued by the said Camden and Amboy Railroad and Transportation Company, the possibility and probability of collision between opposing trains on a single track, is so great, as to prove that some efficient means should be adopted to prevent the recurrence of the cause which has called this Inquest together, and that the safety of the passengers in life and limb, is of more importance than the saving of a few minutes of time.

And the Jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths and affirmations aforesaid, do further say, that as by the "Running Regulations" of the said Company, an Express train is permitted to leave one station when it is known by the Conductor thereof that an opposing Express train is on the road from the next station, such a regulation has been proved by the event of the twenty-ninth of August last, to be inconsistent with the safety of each of said trains, and the passengers and employees thereon.

In witness whereof, as well as the aforesaid Justice of the Peace, acting as Coroner, as the Jurors aforesaid, have hereunto set their hands, and affixed their seals, this fourth day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty-five.

(Signed)

SAMUEL W. EARLE,
Justice of the Peace.

JOHN RODGERS,	LEWIS ROTHERMEL,
WARDROP J. HALL,	EDWARD VOUTE,
SETH THOMAS,	B. FALKINBERG,
H. McDOWELL,	BUDD STERLING,
F. F. BAINBRIDGE,	S. M. EMLY,
JOHN LARZELERE,	LEWIS C. LEEDS,
ROBT. T. WILLITS,	JOHN MITCHELL,
AMOS HUTCHINS,	R. A. WOOLMAN.

The following Jurors refused to sign the verdict: WILLIAM A. ROGERS, W. W. MILLER, and ELISHA BELDEN.

REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

TO THE DIRECTORS OF THE DELAWARE AND RARITAN CANAL AND THE CAMDEN AND AMBOY RAILROAD AND TRANSPORTATION COMPANIES, ON THE ACCIDENT OF THE TWENTY-NINTH OF AUGUST, 1855. APPROVED BY THE JOINT BOARD, AND ORDERED TO BE PRINTED.

BORDENTOWN, September 10, 1855.

GENTLEMEN :—On the morning of the 29th of August, the ten o'clock train from Philadelphia for New York, left, as usual, the Depot at Camden, in charge of Isaac Van Nostrand, one of the most experienced and best conductors in the employ of the Railroad Company. Mr. Van Horn, the agent of the Company, whose duty it is to see that all is right before the train starts from Camden, examined the bell-rope of the ten o'clock train on the morning of the 29th of August, a short time previous to its departure from Camden, and found it right.

The train immediately thereafter proceeded to Burlington, where it arrived safely and in time. The 8 o'clock train from New York, which was then due at Burlington, had not made its appearance, having arrived at New Brunswick behind time. The regulation time of the Philadelphia train at Burlington having expired, and the conductor having ascertained by telegraph, that the New York train had left Bordentown at 10-56 o'clock, he proceeded with the ten o'clock train, as he had done on all previous similar occasions, under the assurance that there was no hazard of collision, because the track was for the most part level and straight, and both trains were known by their respective conductors to be on the track and approaching each other.

There was no collision.

The result proved that the regulation of the Company was a salutary one, enabling the conductor to expedite his train, without the least danger of collision.

As anticipated, the trains came in sight of each other where the track was straight, and, as usual, they both halted; and the Philadelphia train, blowing its whistle, commenced backing at about the rate of fifteen miles per hour, for the nearest turnout; whilst all the employees of the train were keeping a vigilant look-out for obstructions on the road, and attending to the brakes.

The whistle was repeatedly blown, and the employees steadily engaged watching the track, on which cows had been seen as the train was passing up, until the cross-road where the collision took place

was reached ; when of a sudden a pair of horses attached to a carriage, were driven at the rate of eight or ten miles an hour on the track, so near the train as to render it impossible to check its speed, or in any way to prevent the melancholy collision, the fatal results of which are already known to you. From the outside line of the railroad to the car which struck the horses, is twenty-nine feet, which, at the speed of ten miles an hour, would require less than two seconds to pass. How impossible, therefore, is it to devise means for the protection of railroad trains from so sudden and unforeseen obstructions. The safety of the trains can best be secured by requiring all persons, before crossing a railroad, to stop and ascertain whether the road is clear.

The 29th of August was a still day ; there was but little wind, and the whistles of both trains, which were blowing as they saw each other, must have been audible all along the road on which this carriage was travelling from the river, about a mile to the crossing. Besides the repeated blowing of whistles, as sworn to by some of our most respected citizens, from the time the up train first passed the cross road until its return, and the fatal collision occurred ; there was at the crossing a board, with the inscription, "Look out for the locomotive."

The entire truth of the foregoing narrative is, we think, fully, completely, and satisfactorily proved, by the testimony of fourteen reliable men, taken before the Coroner's Jury ; and it does appear to your committee that in all particulars the law of the State and the regulations of the Company were fully complied with by these agents and employees having charge of the trains on the 29th of August. The Coroner's Jury, it is true, say that the engineer did not observe the rules and the law respecting the blowing the whistle. But they must have rejected the positive testimony of the following witnesses : Samuel S. Stryker, of Trenton ; James Garwood, Dean Swift Read, Charles Alcott, Henry Henner, John R. Rodgers, John Rodgers, Hugh Costill, of Burlington ; Allen Thompson, Lloyd Vanderveer, Prescott Harvey, Israel Adams, Samuel Scott, and Maurice Maxwell, all of whom, except the three last, were entirely disinterested, and unconnected with the Company, whose respectability and position forbid the idea that they could have been mistaken ; to find that the whistle was not blown, because other witnesses did not hear it, they reject positive proof of the fact, and assert that it did not take place, because others were not cognizant of its occurrence ; this certainly is a most extraordinary conclusion.

The proper look-out on the part of the brakemen, conductor, and engineer, was observed ; the speed was usual and lawful ; the warning whistle was sounded ; and all due diligence, vigilance, and precaution, were studiously and scrupulously practised. The train had the right to the track, and the engineer and brakemen were on the look-out along the line of the track. There their attention was required and was given. They were not bound to look to the right or

to the left, at a distance from the track, nor is it compatible with safety, where there are usually so many cattle on or near the road, that their attention should thus be diverted. Their business is to concentrate their vigilance on the track. But it is quite evident that the scope of their vision, while thus directed, would take in sufficient space to cover all objects within dangerous proximity to the track, except in just such a case as the one now under consideration, of headlong, impetuous, reckless velocity, precipitating an obstruction far beyond the scope of their vision, immediately in front of the train.

From such a case of intruding obstruction, unless apprised beforehand of the probability of its occurrence, it seems hardly conceivable how railroad trains, with any degree of vigilance, can protect themselves. Besides, had the brakeman observed the horses and carriage approaching upon the cross road, is it probable he would have deemed it necessary to warn the engineer? Could he have deemed it possible that any sane man, in possession of the senses of hearing and seeing, did not see and hear the train and would not have held up short of the railroad track—especially as the ground (as will be seen by reference to the accompanying diagram) was clear and smooth, and nothing to prevent the driver, even after he got close to the railroad, pulling his horses around to the right? “A quick check of the right rein would have thrown his horses parallel with the track” and avoided all danger. On the contrary, had the brakeman seen the carriage approaching, well knowing that the train had the right to the track, it is not presumable that he would have considered it necessary to give the engineer notice of its approach. If he had seen a cow or horse or other brute animal, *controlled only by his own instinct*, on, or approaching the track, he would have attempted to check or to accelerate the train. But if he saw at a distance those animals, apparently under the power and *control of human reason*, no danger was fairly to be apprehended. The law of the land, the dictates of common sense, and the demand of the travelling public, alike forbid the necessity of checking the train for every wagon that can be seen in the neighborhood of a track. There are two hundred and thirty-seven crossings by streets, public roads, lanes, and private crossings; the loss of one minute at each, would make the passage between New York and Philadelphia eight hours instead of four hours.

There appears to be no reasonable doubt that the train was backing at a rate of speed not unusual or unsafe. This part of the track, it must be remembered, was straight, with new iron rails of sixty-four pounds to the yard, and in perfect order. It had been just passed over by the same train, and the track found safe and clear. Besides, there can be but little doubt that in meeting such obstructions on the road, that a higher rate of speed, which in case of collision would probably sweep the impediment off the road without injury to the train, is much safer than a low rate of speed, which would oblige the

train to encounter and embarrass itself with the obstruction, without removing it from the track.

In view of the above facts, the Committee have reviewed the regulations of the Company, to ascertain if any, and what, alterations could be suggested for the better protection of the passengers and trains; and they are constrained to say that they consider the present regulation better than any which has been proposed for running trains on single track roads, and that experience has proved them to be so, even in the recent case of disaster; because it is evident that it was the driver of the horses who caused the accident. Was this not so? Had he been at home, there would have been no accident. He alone is responsible, and the wisdom of the Company's regulations, and the faithfulness of their employees, will stand vindicated before the considerate judgement of an enlightened and moral people.

With this brief narrative of the circumstances attending the melancholy event of the 29th August, as proved before the Coroner's Jury, we might, perhaps, with propriety close this report. The subject, however, of safety on railroads is so connected with the feelings and business of our people, that it calls for a few additional remarks from us. To say that the Company is responsible for this accident because they have not built a double track, is to apply a rule to this Company, which is applied to no other companies. There are supposed to be now more than twenty thousand miles of railroad in operation in the United States, and but a small proportion of double track. Roads which carry many more passengers per annum than the Camden and Amboy Railroad have no double track. Even upon the New York and Erie and Hudson River Roads there are not double tracks through the whole line; and we are not aware that there is any railroad in this country which is so exclusively appropriated for the carriage of passengers as this road is, that has a double track. It is a fact, however, not generally understood, that the Camden and Amboy Railroad Company have now and have had for many years two separate and independent lines for the transit of passengers between New York and Philadelphia. A portion of their trains pass over one track exclusively, and a portion over the other; and it is well known that incipient steps have been taken to construct two more tracks between Trenton and New Brunswick; which, including the Philadelphia and Trenton Railroad, will provide additional facilities between New York and Philadelphia: not in the expectation of preventing accidents, but to expedite the transit between the two cities. Nothing but the depressed state of railroad securities in the money market has prevented the prosecution of this work.

It is held however by many, that double tracks are not that guarantee for safety which is claimed for them; the necessity of backing the trains even on double tracks, in many instances cannot be avoided; switches, the most frequent cause of railroad accidents, must necessarily be multiplied. Certainly the statistics of railroad accidents, in Europe as well as in this country seem to favor that idea. It may

be added likewise, that on double tracks the temptation to maintain high rates of speed is almost irresistible, and that high rates of speed are not as compatible with safety as low rates. The public demand, with reference to railroad travel, safety, cheapness, and speed. Double tracks are indispensable where high rates of speed are in use. But they are not compatible with cheapness or necessary for safety, where a limited number of trains per day are run, as is the case on our road. If lightning from heaven were to strike our cars, it would be as reasonable to say that the Company was responsible for the result, because they have not fixed lightning rods to each car, as to say that the Company is responsible for the recent accident, because they have not built a double track. As to the suggestion of placing a gate at each crossing, that can only be done by legislative authority, and we do not think it would be as safe, as to require every person to halt, and to see that the train is not in sight, before he attempts to cross any railroad, as is the evident intent of the present sign boards required by law.

Every person would in this case have a perfect protection in himself; why diminish it by placing the responsibility elsewhere and upon persons much less interested? As long as wood and iron are so fragile and defective, there can be no absolute safety in travelling at the present speed with which our railroad trains are driven. We would suggest, however, that the best means to obtain the desired safety, would be to alter the whole system of hostile legislation in regard to railroads; to consider them as useful public conveniences entitled to the liberal support and just consideration of the people, and to that protection from the courts and juries which every American freeman has a right to claim; not as nuisances to be reviled without measure and to be libelled and persecuted on all occasions, right or wrong; to make them exclusive; to fence them in from one end to the other; to take the public roads under or over them; to reduce the speed of the trains to twenty-five miles per hour, and to hold all persons trespassers, who without authority from the Company go on the road or suffer their cattle to go on it.

ROBERT L. STEVENS,
ROBERT F. STOCKTON,
EDWIN A. STEVENS,
JNO. R. THOMSON,
JAMES NEILSON,
BENJAMIN FISH,
RICHARD STOCKTON,
JAMES S. GREEN.

THE LATE CAMDEN AND AMBOY RAILROAD ACCIDENT.

A REVIEW OF THE CAMDEN AND AMBOY COMPANY'S REPORT ON THE
ACCIDENT OF THE 29TH OF AUGUST, 1855, BY A BURLINGTONIAN.

The testimony, quoted in this Review, is chiefly that published in the *New York Times*, that being the report of the testimony most convenient at the time of writing. The author has not, intentionally, misstated a single fact. What testimony may hereafter be produced, he knows not. His remarks are made in view of the testimony hitherto made public, or furnished by the Company.

The name of the author is not printed, simply from the motives which control usage under similar circumstances. If any person wishes to ascertain the author's name, it may be ascertained from the Mayor of the City of Burlington. [The Mayor incurs no responsibility whatever, as he has not seen the pamphlet.]

September 24th, 1855.

A TERRIBLE calamity overtook the train of the Camden and Amboy Company on the 29th of August. It spread desolation and mourning throughout hundreds of families in the land. In the special Report of the Executive Committee of the Company, approved by the Board, and just published, no notice is taken of the nature and extent of the disaster, and not a word of sympathy is expressed for the unfortunate sufferers. Twenty-four human beings were killed, and from eighty to a hundred were more or less severely wounded, under circumstances of great aggravation; and yet all is passed by without a syllable of kindly notice or commiseration. Even an Indian could scarcely have been trained to such unnatural indifference. This painful feature of the Report, which will be remembered against the Company, at least during the present generation, can scarcely be accounted for except on the maxim that "Corporations have no souls"—a maxim recognized only at law.

The Report of the Executive Committee is a bold, stern, selfish, uncompromising effort to screen themselves from all responsibility. There is the most disdainful repudiation of blame in anything appertaining to the transaction. If the train had to be run over the road under precisely the same circumstances, this Committee *find nothing to alter*. They utterly, and thoroughly, and from beginning to end, reject the idea of error in the regulations of the Company, or in the conduct of their officers. The exaggerated style of self-vindication, shows the high estimate, entertained by the Company, of their own wisdom in regulating and managing the road. I propose to subject this wisdom to an examination. I have no private ends to answer. Personally acquainted with all the gentlemen, who sign this Report, except two, and well acquainted with some of them, I shall not shrink from the work of exposing the sophistry of their

Report, and of convicting them of errors both in principles and in facts.

It is almost the unanimous judgment of the community that the regulations of the Camden and Amboy Company, in the running of their trains, need revision. Before scrutinizing the conduct of the officers of the train, I shall endeavour to show some of the principal defects in the management of the road, as exemplified in the late awful disaster.

I. It is a great and dangerous error to allow *express trains to meet each other in motion, on a single track*. Few Railroad Companies, if any, tolerate such adventure. Two trains, whose usual speed is each thirty miles an hour, rush towards each other with a power and momentum almost inconceivable. No wonder that a Western gentleman on the train of the 29th, before the accident occurred, was alarmed at the very idea that two express trains, moving in opposite directions, had a right to the road at the same time. The Amboy Company, however, seem to think that, with the speed of thirty miles an hour, a printed word of *caution* is the talisman to prevent all evil. Does the Company forget the terrible smash of the passenger trains near Spotswood two or three years ago? Does the Company forget that, only last winter, two freight trains ran into each other, near Palmyra, on a *perfectly straight road*, where each could see the other *two miles off*? The temptations to get first to the switch, or to the half-way stake, counteract in a great measure all printed precautions. Who that understands human nature, would consider it safe to trust swift passenger trains, running towards each other, to printed regulations, whose caution is thwarted by the very circumstances in which it is enjoined? Moreover, when the disappointed train commences backing, the engineer is unconsciously liable to back too fast, in order not to lose more time, when so much has been already wasted. Sometimes, too, as is reported to have been the case on the day of the disaster, the engineer gets vexed and worried at being obliged to back his train so far, and opens his steam valve under the unsteady motion of professional excitement. The community in general condemn the Company's regulation on this subject. There is no wisdom in the rule which authorizes express trains, running in opposite directions, to meet each other on a single track, away from stations.

II. Another defective and inexpedient regulation is the one *requiring* the conductor to go on with the train, after waiting *ten minutes*. It is not even sure of saving time, which is the great plea for its adoption. For example, on the 29th of August, the Philadelphia train, which met the accident, had to back 2 or 3 miles, and according to the rules at a reduced speed; and if no accident had occurred, it would have left Burlington later, certainly not earlier, than if it had stopped there until the New York train came up. So the train from New York, on the same supposition, was delayed on that day several minutes owing to the reduced speed of the backing

train, and from the necessity of waiting until the latter could get on the turn-out. Furthermore, suppose that the train from Philadelphia had reached the stake between Burlington and Florence *first*, then the New York train would have had to back a mile or two, and get on the turn-out, thereby losing at least five minutes, in addition to the twenty it had already lost. The regulation tolerating such contingencies, is not only dangerous, but inexpedient. The wisest and safest rule is to require the train that comes to Burlington or Bordentown behind time, to *wait there until the other train comes along*, or until the telegraph gives information. There is a telegraph in the Company's office, which is worked by one of their own employees, which can be used in times of emergency, on every day if deemed best, and thus unforeseen events may be provided for, when they occur. On the 29th of August, what was done? After waiting ten minutes, the Conductor telegraphs at 11:02, and learns that the New York train had left Bordentown at 10:56. He therefore had the certain knowledge that that train was already a good distance between Bordentown and Burlington. What then? Does he wait? No, he pushes on *according to rule*, and with the certainty that *one* of the trains must necessarily lose time by the operation; and it is a question whether the New York train, which "connects with the south," shall lose five minutes more, in addition to the twenty minutes it has already lost, or whether the Philadelphia train shall be pushed back a couple of miles, and be no better off, if not worse off, than if it had remained at Burlington. It is said, however, that the passengers become dissatisfied, if the train should wait. Now every passenger knows that nothing dissatisfies him so much as to *go back*, especially when, as in this instance, it was a neck and neck race for the turn-out, and if the train backed at all, it must back two or three miles to the place of starting.

The only contingency in which no time is lost, is when one train happens to get to the turn-out just in time to get on it before the other train comes up. Such an occurrence is a rare one among a thousand chances to the contrary.

Admitting, however, that no time is lost by the rule, I maintain that the rule, allowing trains to proceed, is a bad one, because it diminishes the responsibility of the engineers to be *up to their time*. On all railroads it is of the utmost consequence that the time-table be rigidly observed; and where there is only a single track, the importance of punctuality is greatly increased. But let the engineers and conductors understand that to be behind time may be of no great consequence to the opposite train—which is allowed to advance after waiting ten minutes—and the tendency is to encourage carelessness in this momentous matter, or, at least, to diminish the motives to exact punctuality. On the 29th of August, the train from New York was 20 minutes behind time. Why was this? No reason has ever been given to excuse this great violation of the printed programme. The Amboy directors throw the responsibility on the New

Jersey Company, and state that the train "arrived at New Brunswick behind time." Why was an express train twenty minutes behind time, in a distance of 31 miles? It is obvious that, where such negligences occur, there is no adequate sense of the importance of fulfilling the requirements of the time-table; and it is just as obvious that such negligences will be liable to repetition, unless the conductors and engineers are made to realize that loss of time is followed by serious consequences. This very rule, which requires a train to go forward, after waiting ten minutes, interferes with official responsibility in keeping the trains in subjection to the time-table; and I have before shown that it does not save much, if any, time, in the long run. It is a bad regulation.

III. Another defective regulation, dependent upon the other two, is the running of passenger trains *backwards at fast rates*. There are six reasons which make the backing of trains much more dangerous than their forward motion. In the *first* place, the engineer, who has charge of the motive power, cannot well observe what is behind him, and cannot see the track at all in a straight course, unless he leans over, and then can only partially observe what is on one side of the train. On the 29th of August, the engineer knew nothing of the accident until it was over. *Another* cause of additional danger in backing is that, whilst the engine is provided with what is called a cow-catcher, or a contrivance to remove obstacles from the track, the rear car is exposed to be thrown off by whatever impediment happens to be in the way. A *third* reason is the inherent difficulty, on mechanical principles, of preserving backward motion in a right line. Let any one make the experiment on a child's railroad or wagon, and he will find the difficulty, even the impossibility, of pushing it back on the same line on which he drew it forward. A backing train cannot turn a curve at the same rate as an advancing one, without running greater danger. Even in backing on a straight track, especially if the train be a long one, there is always considerable hazard; and at a high speed, very great hazard. The pressure on the flanges of the wheels is much greater in backing than in going forward; and the chances of running off the track are more numerous. In the *fourth* place, when accidents occur in backing, they are liable to be on a larger scale, and more serious, than when going forward. If the rear car gets off the track when going fifteen miles an hour, the wreck of the whole train is almost inevitable. Not only is the right line most easily broken by backward motion, but when broken, it more quickly extends the damage over the whole train. The divergence of the rear car speeds sure calamity to its fellows. A *fifth* reason of the increased danger in backing is, that when the engine is thrown off, and the accident happens in front, the motive power is stopped at once, whereas in backing *the power continues in motion on the rails*. This terrible fact greatly aggravated the horrors of the late disaster. The engine kept up its swift revolutions and energetic strokes in the midst of crashing timbers and dying

agonies. In the *sixth* place, backing trains are more dangerous from the fact that they are out of time and unexpected; and the engine being behind, cannot be seen by travellers, nor is it likely to give the same signs of its approach. In view of these various reasons, I maintain that the backing of trains, and especially of express trains filled with human beings, is a very dangerous experiment; and the regulation of the Company, authorizing, and in certain cases requiring, this backward motion even for two or three miles, is a bad regulation, and ought to be changed.

These suggestions in regard to the defective management of this great railroad will, I doubt not, commend themselves to the great mass of intelligent and observing persons. The Amboy Company, however, show in their late Report a tenacity of preconceived rules, and an obstinacy of opinion, rarely to be encountered. They say that they "have reviewed the regulations of the Company to ascertain, if any, and what alterations could be suggested for the better protection of the passengers and trains; and they are constrained to say [the public will judge what sort of constraint is laid upon them] that they consider the present regulations better than any that has been proposed for running trains on single track roads, and that experience has proved them to be so, *even in the recent case of disaster.*" Oh, gentlemen, do you point, in proof of the wisdom of your rules, to your bleeding and dying victims? Do you add insult to injury, and mockery to massacre? So it seems to me. Well that corporations have no souls, if such are their specimens of rationality and evidences of existence.

In the Company's Report, all the blame is laid upon Dr. Heineken. The logic is wonderful: "Had *he* been at *home*, there would have been no accident!" The way, then, to prevent blundering regulations from killing people, is to keep them within doors! This sentence might be retorted upon the Company's rules and officers in a thousand ways, with much more righteousness of application than against the careless and unwarned driver of the vehicle. It is my object now, with no unkind feeling towards the Company or its officers, but with a sacred regard to the rights of the living and the dead, to charge the chief blame of the accident upon the Company's employees, and upon the Company, who, not only employ but vindicate them. Their act was the act of the Company, inasmuch as the latter make it theirs, in vindicating their employees from all blame. The Report says: "The *proper* lookout on the part of the brakemen, conductor, and engineer, was observed; the speed was *usual* and *lawful*; the warning whistle was *sounded*; and all *due diligence, vigilance, and precaution*, were *studiously* and *scrupulously* practised." If there is such a thing as "damning by *faint* praise," the Company here show that the same thing can be done with a vengeance by overwhelming praise. Let us calmly and dispassionately examine this programme of vindication.

1. "The *proper* lookout on the part of the brakemen, conductor,

and engineer, was observed." The testimony before the coroner's jury, shows that the brakeman on the front platform of the rear car had left his allotted post of observation, because he could not see the track sufficiently well, and that while in the act of returning to his assigned post, he was caught at the time of the accident in the middle of the car, and was thrown among its fragments without seeing horses and carriage. His "proper lookout" was, therefore, no lookout at all. He was out of his place, and saw nothing.

The other brakeman has a seat in the gig-top on the engine tender, with his face to the rear of the train—a very wise plan. But what is his duty, and how did he act? Let us quote from the testimony. "Q. Is it your duty to watch that the cross-roads are clear? A. *I do not consider it my duty to do so.* Q. Did you see the cars strike the horses? A. Yes, I was looking back, and when I saw the horses, *it was too late.* Q. Too late for what? A. To ring the bell, or *prevent the accident*; I tried to ring the bell, but couldn't; suppose something was the matter with the rope. Q. Where were you when the accident happened? A. I was *standing on the brake-house.*"* It appears, then, that this brakeman was out of his place, which purposely confined his view exclusively to the rear; and was standing up in another place, probably to look at the opposite train. At any rate, he did not see the obstruction, until the accident happened, and then the bell-rope was "foul." His "proper lookout," therefore, involved three things: he was out of his seat; he saw nothing in time to prevent the disaster, and his rope was out of order.

How was it with the *conductor*? He says that he changed his position to the left side, but does not say whether he was looking forward, or backward, at the time of the accident. He says, however, that he saw the brakeman who ought to have been in the gig-top, and as the brakeman's position was nearer the engine, the conductor was, of course looking forward at that time. Inasmuch as other testimony proves that the dust on the left side prevented the view of the track in backing, the conductor either chose that side as the best to observe the opposite train, or he did not show good judgment in choosing the dusty side for watching the rear of the train. His "proper lookout" was without any useful result, and as inefficient for the prevention of the accident as if he had chosen it on purpose.

The *engineer's* lookout was none whatever, at the time of the accident; for he was inside the engine-house, unconsciously backing

* The *brake-house* is on the baggage car, and not far from the gig-top. The former was on the baggage-car belonging to the New Jersey Company; but the gig-top was the brakeman's place, whilst on the Amboy train. The brake-house allows the person to look either forwards or backwards. The Regulations of the Camden and Amboy Company is as follows: "Brakemen shall always be in their places when the train starts (*one in the gig-top on the tender, another on the front platform of the last passenger car*), and not leave them while the train is in motion; they shall have the bell-rope in their hand, and watch the train constantly, and be prepared to give and obey the signals promptly." The "proper lookout" on the occasion was thus against the rules of the Company.

his engine on the dying and the dead. The *fireman* said that he looked out once in a while, but "thought it would be useless to keep a constant lookout." Besides, he added, "I have merely to watch the front of the track."

Who can say, in view of this testimony, that there was a "proper lookout" on the ill-fated train? The fact is that not one of the officers was looking at the crossing at the time, except the forward brakeman who took a glance, just as the horses came on the track, and too late to prevent the accident, even if his bell-rope had been in order. If the Company maintain that there was a "*proper* lookout" at the time of the accident, they deserve, and are likely to get, the severest chastisement that a strong and indignant public opinion can administer.

2. The Company next maintain, that *the speed was usual and lawful*. The engineer on the wrecked train admits that he was going fifteen miles an hour, whilst the engineer on the other train said that *he* was going twenty miles an hour, and only "following" the backing train. The conductor, also, allows, that the rate was fifteen miles an hour, and, perhaps, "a little faster some of the way." The testimony of the passengers and of the spectators, with some exceptions, is, that the speed was very uncommon and alarming. It seems to have excited general attention, both inside and outside of the cars. A farmer, in seeing the train pass, observed to some of his family: "There will be a smash up." The engineer was, no doubt, going at a very high and unlawful speed. A moderate rate could never have produced the awful results that followed. There was, unfortunately, on that day, an unusually strong temptation for the engineer to increase his speed. Both trains were behind time, one of them twenty, and the other ten, minutes; and the distance to be run back was about two and a half miles—a *very long* distance to back a train. The probabilities of the case, therefore, go to confirm the testimony of the passengers and spectators; and the declaration of the engineer of the New York train that the speed was generally about twenty miles an hour, is as near the truth as any other. It was an unusual speed. It was an unsafe speed in a backing train. The statement in the Report, that the rails were "new," and weighed "sixty-four pounds to the yard," conveys information, but is no extenuation for this rapid, retrograde motion.

There is, under the circumstances, a singular plea for fast motion in the Report: "Besides, there can be but little doubt that, in meeting such obstructions on the road, a higher rate of speed, which, in case of collision, would probably sweep the impediment off the road, without injury to the train, is much safer than a low rate of speed, which would oblige the train to encounter and embarrass itself with the obstruction, without removing it from the track." P. 7. Now, inasmuch as the impediment in this instance did do "injury to the train," the reasoning of the Company, or at least an inference from it, is, that the backing train ought to have gone at "a *higher* rate

of speed." If the remark has a complete application to the case, fifteen or twenty miles an hour seems not to be fast enough in the judgment of the Company, to secure a backing train *against accidents!* After the above statement, it is no wonder that the Company maintain, that the high speed of their train, at the time of the disaster, was a "lawful" one; and if that high speed was "usual," it only makes out the case worse for themselves. All impartial people now believe, that the train was going backwards with a very dangerous velocity, and that such velocity rendered it almost impossible for the engineer to check it in time to avoid accidents, even if he had been on the lookout!

3. The Company further declare, that the *warning whistle was sounded*. The Coroner's jury, however, who spent four days in examining witnesses, under oath, declare the contrary. But that is nothing to the Company! The Report adds: "The Coroner's jury, it is true, say that the engineer did not observe the rules and law respecting blowing the whistle." And, in the next sentence, the Report affirms, that "the warning whistle *was* sounded." Let us look into this matter a little.

The testimony about the whistle is contradictory.

(1.) Passengers in the train, spectators on the road near the accident, and the persons in the carriage, all testify that they did not hear the whistle blow at the river-road crossing. This testimony is strong and direct.

(2.) The engineer of the train, after he had seen the injury he had inflicted upon many human beings, declared in the agony of ingenuous and natural sorrow, "*O, if I had only blowed that whistle, those persons would not have been killed.*" The conductor then said, "You did blow the whistle." But the engineer persisted in denying it, and said, "*No, I didn't.*" I am aware that an effort is made to exculpate the engineer, by the plea that he was temporarily crazy, and did not know what he was saying! But his words were in exact accordance with the testimony of many witnesses, and they were uttered in honest moments, and under circumstances of solemnity, which gave them the emphasis almost of a death-bed confession. The engineer *twice* declared to the conductor that he did not blow the whistle, and said the same thing to other persons; this was his original testimony.

3. On the other hand, respectable witnesses declare that they *did* hear the whistle blow. The Company's Report states that fourteen persons heard the whistle, including the engineer, two other officials, John Rodgers, and John R. Rodgers, the two latter being one and the same man, who was foreman of the Coroner's jury, and who signed the verdict which, according to the Company's Report, denies that the whistle was sounded.* It is indeed true that positive testi-

* Mr. Rodgers said, at his examination, that "it was his *impression* that the whistle was sounded." Mr. Rodgers says that the verdict only denies that the whistle was *rightly* sounded. But the Company, and almost everybody, have put the

mony goes farther than negative ; but all the circumstances of the event must be carefully pondered, and perhaps a strict examination will enable us to reconcile the positive and negative testimony. There are two theories which will harmonize all the testimony. Let it be remembered that a number of whistles were sounded on that day by both trains. The Report affirms that "the whistle was repeatedly blown," and further, that "the 29th of August was a still day, and that there was but little wind" to render the whistle inaudible anywhere, along the whole route travelled backwards. Now, what is more natural in the first place, than that a witness, not attending particularly to the circumstances, should, after the accident, be unable to discriminate between the whistles (which were all sounded within the space of five minutes), and think that, because he heard one or two blows of the whistle, he therefore heard the one that ought to have been sounded at the last crossing? Look, for example, at the testimony of Mr. Harvey, the Express Agent, one of the thirteen, who was located near the conductor.

Q. "How long before the collision, did you hear the whistle? A. Am not sure of the distance ; think *about half a mile*. Q. How long after the blow, did the break-up take place? A. Some *two or three minutes*. Q. Did you hear any sound of the whistle immediately before the collision? A. *I did not.*" Mr. Harvey's testimony proves that the whistle may have been blown at the preceding crossing, which is nearly a mile off, but not at the one "immediately before the collision." For the whistle at each particular crossing is heard only a few *seconds* before the cars reach it. Mr. Harvey does not prove what the Company endeavour to make out. The testimony of some of the other witnesses may also be explained on the same theory as Mr. Harvey's.

There is another theory which may assist in reconciling the conflicting testimony ; namely, some of the witnesses may have heard the whistle of the *other train*. Let the reader consider that the day was a "*still*" one ; the sound of all the whistles came from the *same direction* ; and the two trains were *quite close together*, not more, probably, than half a mile apart. It is not at all unlikely, therefore, that some of the passengers might have supposed that the whistle, which really came from the other train, was sounded by their own.

The testimony of almost all the disinterested witnesses, who think the proper whistle was sounded, may be reconciled with the testimony of those who maintain the contrary, on the assumption that the former heard the whistle at the crossing-place beyond the river road, or heard the whistle of the other train. Either of these theories is a natural one, and accounts for all the facts in the case.

The only witnesses who swear positively that the whistle was

other interpretation upon it. [The verdict says that the rules of the Company and of the State were violated both in "*approaching and crossing*," &c.,—which seems to mean, in every respect, from beginning to end.]

sounded with a prolonged sound, and within three hundred yards of the fatal crossing-place, are, for the most part, connected with the railroad by present or former ties; a few of them are not. Without at all impeaching their character, I must be permitted to interpret their testimony in a way that allows me to believe other impartial, disinterested, and respectable witnesses. Where there is conflicting testimony, a necessity exists either to harmonize it on some plausible and natural theory, or after weighing the facts, to credit some parts of the testimony, and to discredit other parts. After a careful examination of the matter, I come to the conclusion of the Coroner's Jury, namely, that the whistle was not sounded by the engineer at the crossing of the river road. The language of the Coroner's Jury is as follows:

"And the Jurors aforesaid upon their oaths and affirmations aforesaid, do further say, that the engineer of the said backing train did not observe the rules of the Camden and Amboy Railroad and Transportation Company, and Laws of the State of New Jersey, in reference to the blowing of the steam whistle on the engine, in approaching and crossing the place where the railroad crosses the said river road."

But even admitting that the whistle was sounded,—it is perfectly clear that it was not sounded *sufficiently*, nor was it sounded according to the *laws of the State*. If some few did hear the sound, a great many persons did not. Dr. Heineken and his party did not hear it. The lady whose house was at the crossing, did not. Adam Price, who saw the cars afar off, did not. The switch-tender of the Mount Holly turn-out, who was near by, watching the train with a signal flag in his hand, did not. Almost all the passengers did not. The Honorable Mr. McClay speaks the general sentiment of his fellow-passengers, in affirming that the whistle was not heard. Admitting, therefore, that it was sounded, it was not sounded in a way that answered the purpose of the law. It is certain that the law of the State, under which the Company acts, was violated on the occasion. The act of March 9, 1839, which required a *bell* to be rung at least 300 yards from every crossing, and to be *kept ringing* until the engine had crossed the road, was modified by the act of March 26, 1852, so as to allow the use of a whistle under similar conditions. The Trenton State Gazette has the following statement on the subject:

"A supplement to the act, approved March 26, 1852, requires the use of a *bell* or *steam whistle* which can be *heard* distinctly three hundred yards; and such *bell* to be *rung*, or such *steam whistle* to be *blown* at the distance of at least three hundred yards from the place where such railroad crosses a turnpike road or highway upon the same level, and so *continued* to be *rung* or *blown*, until the engine has crossed such turnpike or highway, or has stopped." No witness testified that the engineer blew his whistle, as the *law directed*. Everybody knows that he did not. The "warning whistle," if sounded,

was not sounded according to law. There was a culpable negligence in failing to comply with the statutes of the State—as I think, first, in not sounding the “warning whistle” at all, and secondly, *if* sounded, in not sounding it in the lawful way or to any useful purpose.

4. The fourth specification of the Company is that “*all due diligence, vigilance, and precaution, were studiously and scrupulously practised.*” These words, made studiously and scrupulously emphatic, sound like a farce after a tragedy. They are a burlesque upon the horrors of a day of great negligence and woe. What was the diligence, vigilance, and precaution of the engineer, who backed his train at a tremendous rate, kept no effectual lookout, and who either failed to blow his whistle at all, or blew it feebly and not continuously, according to law? What was the diligence, vigilance, and precaution of the amiable and popular conductor, who allowed the engineer to back as fast as he pleased, who kept no thorough watch himself on the rear of the train except some occasional glances backwards and chiefly on the dusty side, and who allowed the foreward brakeman to leave his seat unrebuked? What was the diligence, vigilance, and precaution of the two brakemen, both of whom deserted their proper places at a time when the train was running back at a hazardous speed, and neither of whom was of any more use at the time of the accident than if he had been at the depot at Camden? And yet these men are lauded in the Report as not merely practising diligence, vigilance, and precaution, but “*due*” diligence, &c.; yes, and “*all due diligence,*” &c. Moreover, they “*studiously and scrupulously*” practised all due diligence, vigilance, and precaution! Far be it from me to ridicule the careless and inefficient employees, who intended no harm, or the signers of the Report. The occasion is too solemn. Let the facts speak, and be the interpreters of their conduct. I think the employees of the Company are far less to blame than the Executive Committee and Stockholders, who attempt to excuse their conduct. Better for the reputation of the latter, if their Report had never emerged from the secret council-chamber at Bordentown. The statements and language of the Report are highly censurable; and this, so far as I have heard, is the general sentiment of the public. One of the severest sufferers among the bereaved declared, after reading the Report, that, afflicted as he was, he considered himself in a better condition than the signers of that document.

A few remarks will finish this Review.

The Report throws the whole blame of the disaster on Dr. Heineken. It says, “Had he been at home, there would have been no accident. He alone is responsible; and the wisdom of the Company’s regulations, and the faithfulness of their employees, will stand vindicated before the considerate judgment of an enlightened and moral people!” P. 8. The Company cannot exculpate themselves by blaming Dr. Heineken. An enlightened and moral people” will censure both parties. Dr. Heineken cannot escape censure. He is eccentric, impulsive, and blundering, and he carries all these qualities into his driving. His

chief errors were precisely those of the employees of the Company; he was going too fast over a crossing, and he was not on the lookout. Yet there are several things that extenuate his misconduct on this occasion. He was not expecting the train at the crossing at 15 minutes past 11, the train from Bordentown being due at the crossing nearly half an hour before; he was riding at such an angle to the railroad that the direction of the train at the crossing was almost behind his back;* the cars were backing, and the engine being behind, the train made less noise and could be less easily seen than if the engine had been in front; and he heard no warning whistle, and believes that none was sounded. Besides, good Mrs. Cook, who beckoned to him to stop, called off his attention, in the opposite direction from the cars, at the very *crisis of his opportunity*. These circumstances help to palliate Dr. Heineken's conduct, but they are not sufficient to exculpate him for his fast driving and want of careful observation at so dangerous a point as a railroad crossing. The Doctor rightly escaped an indictment for manslaughter, but he must not expect to recover damages for the loss of his horses. His conduct has received general condemnation; and, instead of attempting to purge himself, after the Company's fashion, he ought to confess his folly and weep over its consequences.

The Camden and Amboy Company have been often reminded that, in addition to better rules for its management, their railroad ought to have a DOUBLE TRACK. Their stock is commonly from 30 to 50 per cent. above par; they have the monopoly of the business; and the public safety requires the improvement. The suggestions made in the Report about fencing the track, and carrying the public roads over or under the track, are very sensible ones. Still, a *double track* is the great want of the concern; and *rails laid down* are better than the wisest of paper suggestions.

In the meantime, until this great reform is perfected, the Company will do well to revise their regulations, in conformity with public opinion. Their indictment before the Grand Jury for defective and dangerous rules, or the interposition of the Legislature of the State, must be resorted to, in order to teach them wisdom, if, after all that has happened, they persist in exposing the public to the hazard of their present mode of managing this great single-tracked thoroughfare.

* Persons, visiting the fatal crossing, are apt, when they look *up* the two roads, to think it the strangest thing in the world that Dr. Heineken did not see the cars. But, when the view is taken from the opposite direction, as you are coming from the river *towards* the crossing, it will be found that, when the driver of the carriage was *near* the crossing, the direction of the cars was very much from *behind*. The fact must also be taken into the account that a man, with a child in his arms, was sitting next to the Doctor on the side towards the cars, and obstructed his view. It must also be remembered that the Doctor was not expecting the cars at that hour; whilst persons, who visit the locality, come there *just to see*.

TO THE REV. C. VAN RENSSELAER, D.D.

PRINCETON, October 11, 1855.

Sir: In the indulgence of a prurient proclivity to perform the functions of censor universal, over all departments, social, political, economical, as well as religious, you have entered the arena alongside of those clerical "friends" who have been recently engaged in the work of traducing the Directors of the Joint Companies; and have published an anonymous pamphlet in reference to the accident which occurred on the Camden and Amboy Railroad, on the 29th of August. If you had confined your remarks to the management of the Board, however harsh or unworthy of a Christian minister they might have been, I should not have deemed it a duty incumbent on me to make any reply. But you have accused us of want of feeling upon the occasion, of "unnatural indifference, of a more than Indian stoicism," charges which seem to call for some notice.

The assassin of character as well as of life "loves darkness rather than light," and as your designs were incompatible with the character and propriety of a Christian gentleman and minister, you have, in some measure, properly assumed the anonymous mask, rather than disgrace a time-honored ancestry by affixing your name to a production replete with slander and misrepresentation. You ought to have known, however, in perpetrating so unusual an outrage upon others, that your clandestine disguise would be torn away, and that your name and clerical character would be revealed.

The newspaper extracts which you have added to your pamphlet seem naturally to suggest that the prominent aim of your publication is to act as an auxiliary to those newspapers which, for malicious and mercenary purposes, have so recklessly assailed the Joint Companies and the State of New Jersey; and have sought, regardless of facts, to prejudice the unfortunate event, and as far as possible to create a public opinion by clamor and denunciation, which might render courts and juries the subservient ministers of vengeance, and coadjutors with those interested enemies of the Joint Companies, who for more than twenty years have sought their destruction.

Your pamphlet seems likewise to indicate that you are on the popular side, in your labors to criminate the Companies; and that notoriety is another object of your most unexpected and puerile attack. I am not at all indisposed to aid your itching in this way; and, whilst I have no intention, at present, of replying to the various perversions of facts and special pleadings of your publication, I will briefly notice your most prominent and important charge against the Directors. But before I proceed to do even that, I may be permitted to say that I am not aware of any particular qualification possessed by the clergy, which enables them to instruct railroad Companies with regard to the construction and management of railroads. Where have you, reverend sir, obtained that information which justifies your setting up your *ipse dixit* against the experience and knowledge of those who have devoted the best part of their lives to the consideration of railroad subjects? If it belongs to your professional duties to give instruction on those subjects, I must be permitted to express the hope that the General Assembly of your Church will assign that duty to some one who can perform it with better temper, more wisdom and discretion, and in a more Christian spirit. If you possess a better knowledge of railroad matters than those who have devoted more than a quarter of a century to the subject, and have a true desire to do good, your instructions will be much more likely to prove useful if delivered with less ostentation, without intemperate invective, and characterized by a severe respect for truth. But I am willing to leave the question of your superior wisdom and prudence to the decision of your friends, without another word.

You make it a matter of enormous crime that, in the Report of the Executive Committee, "sympathy is not expressed for the unfortunate sufferers." You call it a "*painful feature*" of the Report; "*unnatural indifference*," and multiply epithets of reproach for this omission.

You, sir, cannot be ignorant of the fact, that immediately after the accident, the directors and officers of the railroad Companies repaired to Burlington, and by their conduct and active ministrations of the most substantial character, manifested their sympathy for the sufferers. You may be ignorant of the unlimited expenditures which they authorized for the alleviation of the suffering and distressed, yet a little inquiry would have supplied you with that information. An unwilling press could not, however, withhold from them the commendation which you must have read in the papers, though you never allude to it. But are you quite sure that the expression of sympathy in the Report would have been well received, and altogether consistent with propriety? Or that the expression of sympathy in a business document, at the time and under the circumstances connected with it, branded daily as the Directors were then branded—as malefactors and murderers by the pulpit and the press, and by a clergyman in the bar-room and streets of Burlington—would be treated by those instruments for creating public opinion as a mockery? You would then probably have accused them of hypocrisy, of shedding crocodile tears, of insulting the mourner with professions from mercenary motives, and similar imputations would have been made by writers not less ungenerous and acrimonious than you.

The sympathies of the Directors and their sorrows for the dead and the injured were quietly and without publication exhibited in the sacred privacy of the sick chamber, and addressed personally to the unfortunate surviving sufferers. Their sympathy and sorrow were not professed “to be seen of men.” They were too solemn, sincere and grave to be thrust before the public in a formal report or narrative of a standing business committee. The sensibility which abstained from the cheap profession of sympathy in such a document was in good taste, though incapable of being appreciated by that coarse vulgarity which ascribes to words of profession more value than to acts of beneficence.

“I thank thee that I am not as other men, or even as this publican,” is a sentiment conspicuous in that portion of your pamphlet which deploras, in such piteous tones, the want of sympathy in the Report of the Executive Committee to the Board of Directors, dated September 10th, 1855. That Report is so complete and ample a refutation of the charges against the Company, that the fault-finders seem to be at a loss how to impeach it. But you have discovered that it is deficient in sympathy. Yet with all your sophistry, and impassioned appeals to the excited feelings, as well as to the prejudices, of the community, you have failed to discover a single serious fault in that Report. Your three points on the regulations are nothing more or less than an impeachment of a single-track railroad.

Reverend sir, you cannot believe, notwithstanding what you have written, that the Directors, collectively, or individually, were without sympathy for the sufferers on that lamentable occasion. No, sir, you cannot think so. Common charity forbids it. No man born in a civilized country, with the advantages of a Christian education, could be destitute of feeling on such an occasion. You say that you know all the Directors but two—if you do know them, you must feel assured that few hearts were more stricken with sorrow than theirs, although the calamity, as far as they were concerned, was purely accidental; and that if money could have prevented it, or saved the lives of its unfortunate victims, or healed the bleeding hearts of bereaved relatives, it would have been poured out freely.

The Directors of the Joint Companies are the trustees and the guardians of the property of thousands invested in their works and securities. That property constitutes, in some instances, the sole dependence of widows and orphans, and of retired gentlemen and their families. The magnitude of the trust and responsibility thus devolved upon them, is appreciated by them, and felt in all its momentous weight. As humane, kind, generous, and benevolent gentlemen, the Directors may well compare with the same number wherever they may be sought—either as citizens, husbands, or fathers. There are eighteen Directors of the Joint Companies, all of whom, I believe, are men with families, and I think it may be said, that hardly a train passes over the road without having in the cars a Director or some of his family.

Now, reverend sir, to attempt to cast odium on such gentlemen, with such characteristics and such responsibilities, because in an official report, emanating from

a standing committee of the Board, and only addressed to them as Directors, and not to the public, and only published to inform the public as to certain facts respecting the regulations of trains on the railroad—displays a desire to criminate the Companies at all hazards, altogether inconsistent, in my opinion, with Christian charity and that regard for truth and justice which ought to distinguish all clerical efforts to enlighten mankind.

You, sir, who make this accusation, are a professional sympathizer general; it may be natural, therefore, for you to insist on its public and ostentatious manifestation on all occasions, without regard to the proprieties of time and place. And it ought, perhaps, to be considered as equally natural for you to magnify your own merit as a sympathizer, by contrasting your profuseness in that particular, with the deficiency of others.

It might, perhaps, have better suited your idea of sympathy, had the Directors, in their Report, offered to pay five thousand dollars for each death. But, nevertheless, and notwithstanding the pulpit and the press have denounced the Companies as murderers, and called aloud for money, as the price of blood; and notwithstanding the Directors open their treasury without reserve for the relief of the unfortunate sufferers, still, reverend sir, they have not been able so far to overcome the decencies and proprieties of civilized and Christian men, as to offer a pecuniary consideration for the loss of life. Their purse is still open; but who will make the offer? Who, but the Rev. Wadsworth, dare insult the living and the dead by such a mercenary and merciless token of sympathy.

There are cases, undoubtedly, when a money gratuity may, when the proper time arrives, with good feeling and proper delicacy, be offered. But for one, be the consequences what they may, I will not quail before the threatenings of the press, or the uncharitable anathemas of the pulpit, nor will I, under the imputation of guilt, moral or otherwise, consent to give the "*whole capital*," or even one dime of that capital, on the demand of either clerical or political demagogues.

And now, reverend sir, in conclusion, permit me to hope that this letter may not be considered "arrogant or defiant."

With great consideration, your obedient servant,

R. F. STOCKTON.

TO COMMODORE R. F. STOCKTON.

BURLINGTON, N. J., Oct. 16, 1855.

DEAR SIR:—A singular sort of a letter appeared in yesterday's Ledger, purporting to be addressed by yourself to me. The only difficulty I have in answering it is, that of engaging in a controversy with a person who seems to be so unscrupulous an adversary. But the public will expect from me, under the circumstances, a reply to this Commodore of the American Navy, in some measure worthy of his deserts. If the Company's Report was a blunder of the brains, the Commodore's Letter is a blunder of the passions. So far as relates to its various epithets and insinuations, freely used in a rough, marine, and thoughtless manner, it might be allowed to pass off with its own noise. But as the communication affords a better opportunity than could have been expected of giving another public rebuke to the famous Company, which issued that famous Report—famous for its stoicism, famous for its reasoning, and famous for its statement of facts,—I do not at all regret the occasion that invites a reply. I shall use plainness of speech, knowing that seamen, like yourself, appreciate openness and honesty; but I shall not impeach motives, or follow the foolish example of calling hard names. The personal abuse you have seen fit to lavish upon me, can do no harm. If your reputation can bear giving the abuse, I venture to hope that mine can bear taking it.

The Letter is clear proof that my Review has *hit the mark*. The only homage to the truth which you seem capable of giving it, has been rendered; and that is, that it has deeply stirred your anger. This ebullition I regret for your own sake. It is doubtless hard for a person in your position to realize that his conduct is not beyond the truthful criticisms of persons who, in the discharge of duty, are unterrified

by the face of man ; but, my dear sir, the lesson administered to you, although a hard one, and received so unamiably, will probably have a permanent effect. I have observed that the hardest lessons, when well learned, are the longest retained.

Every statement in the Review I take satisfaction in publicly reaffirming. The remark about the Indians, which has given you some uneasiness, I do not retract. It is my firm belief that there is not a tribe in North America whose sachems, sitting around their council fires, would fail to express sympathy under similar circumstances. If the sachems, however, were to become *incorporated*, they too, might learn to follow the example of white men, and suppress the humane instincts, for which nature pleads. I never intended to impeach the private sympathies and sorrows of yourself, or of your associates. I believe that you are all "honorable men," and equal to the average of railroad managers anywhere. But your Report demonstrates that when men act together in a corporate capacity, they will say and do things which they would be ashamed of as private individuals. Your letter, in contrast with the document of the corporation, is an example.

The sternness with which the disaster is alluded to, or *silenced*, in the Company's Report, is very different from the feelings of humanity expressed in your communication. Why, then, my dear sir, did you advocate the erasure, as is reported, of the few words of sympathy that might have been the redeeming trait of the document? You say that it was partly on the ground of "good taste." I must be permitted to reply that the excuse is as unfortunate as the offence. What school of culture inculcates the sentiment that the kindly feelings of our nature are out of place in a public document? Or, was it because you were apprehensive of being "accused of hypocrisy, of shedding crocodile tears, of insulting the mourner with professions from mercenary motives?" My dear sir, when did sympathy, properly expressed, ever insult a mourner? In a community, anxious, under the oppression of a severe public disaster, to seize hold of anything creditable to their great Railroad Company, such puerile and unmanly fears are an impeachment of the character of others as well as of your own.

In one part of your letter, however, I understand you to say that the Report was a business document, drawn up only for the Directors. If so, there was no danger of the imputation of "crocodile tears;" for surely among yourselves, and around your own table, you have not so far lost social confidence in each other as to be afraid to mingle your sorrow with that of the community. But your document for the Directors was also intended for the public. It was printed in pamphlet form, and sent by mail to different individuals, to myself among others, and published in almost all the papers of the neighboring villages and cities.

The dread of "insulting the mourner" as a plea for the want of feeling in the report, is also inconsistent with what you say about the Directors immediately "repairing to the scene of the disaster, and manifesting their sympathy for the sufferers." If you were not afraid of imputations upon your humanity, on the spot of the accident, when the excitement against the Company was at its height, what reason was there for suppressing it, through fear of misrepresentation, in a document prepared twelve days after? Besides, the suppression of sympathy in an historical account of the transaction, indicates a *calculation* on the subject not easily reconcilable with the ingenuous, frank, spontaneous rising of the emotion. You were, however, bent upon vindicating the Company from *all responsibility* in the disaster, and yet your motives in attempting such vindication were just as liable to perversion and mockery as the expression of sympathy. This calculating suppression of condolence, at a time when a feeling of generous commiseration pervaded the whole community, indicates the consciousness of a general alienation from the Company, not very creditable to its reputation. You designedly, and from prudential reasons, as it now appears, lost the opportunity of conciliating the public mind; for at that time a small amount of sympathy would have gone very far to relieve the Company. But, as is often the case with calculating persons, an error was committed, which your letter cannot now cover over. "It is worse than a sin," said a distinguished character, "it is a blunder." Sir, the deliberate omission of human sympathy in the Report was, as a mere matter of calculation, a gross and discreditable blunder. As a matter of morals, I need not characterize it, in addressing one whose temper allows him to forget his self-respect.

Your letter carefully abstains from examining my strictures about the "all due diligence, vigilance and precaution which were studiously and scrupulously practised" on the day of the accident—the language of the Report, which will hiss in the ears of the Directors as long as they live. Nor do you allude to the deficient regulations of the Company, that may be practised every day, to the peril of thousands of human beings. "What can clergymen know about railroads?" is your indignant inquiry, just as if railroads ought to be managed on any other principles than those of common sense, and which commend themselves to the public mind generally. The regulations allowing express trains to meet each other in motion on a single track, and to run backwards at high rates of speed, are condemned by all classes and conditions of men, and by the managers of at least many other railroads.

You mistake in saying that my three strictures are simply "an impeachment of a single track;" they are an impeachment of *your mode of managing* a single track. A single track, bad as it is on a great thoroughfare, is susceptible of a comparatively safe management under sensible rules, framed to meet its peculiar requirements.

The Report of the Company being a public one, you have no right to find fault with any person for venturing to review it, unless his review contains errors. It will not do for men in your position to cry out "What business have the clergy to investigate these matters?" Not to mention the fact that clergymen are as liable to be killed as others, as this very disaster painfully proves, I beg you to understand, sir, that clergymen have the same civil rights as other persons, and that they have not divested themselves of any of those rights, as citizens, which you yourself enjoy. This pusillanimous attempt to excite prejudice against the clergy, is in keeping with the whole tenor of your letter, and with the general administration of the Company's affairs. If there is any class in the community who may be supposed to take an interest in the protection of human life, it is those who are habitually called upon to contemplate the momentous issues involved in its destruction. If my Review contained anything unchristian in its spirit, I should deeply deplore it. Those who have read it must form their own judgment. I shall claim my right, as a Jerseyman, to discuss the subject of railroads, in all proper methods, whenever I may see fit, and especially whenever a great emergency arises, like the present, which spreads mourning through many families, with some of which I am personally acquainted.

The accusation that my Review was written for the purpose of creating a prejudice against the Company, and of anticipating the decisions of justice, is very preposterous when coming from the Company, whose one-sided and elaborate Report of the disaster was circulated far and wide in newspapers and pamphlets, *just before the Grand Jury of Burlington County met*. The Review was intended to expose the misstatements of that unjust and ungenerous Report, and to let its authors know that public sentiment cannot be outraged with impunity.

In your Letter the attempt is made to escape from offering to compromise for damages, with the unfortunate sufferers, on the ground that "you have not been able to overcome the decencies and proprieties of civilized and Christian men." The public will be glad to learn this—for the unfeeling tone of the Report had produced a somewhat contrary impression. But I must be allowed to add, Commodore, that the announcement that you still claim such decencies and proprieties, occurs under circumstances that make some at a loss to understand it. Do you not know, sir, that suits have been already instituted to recover damages for the destruction of human life occasioned by your mismanaged train? And yet, you publicly and harshly reflect upon the bereaved, and, by plain implication, characterize their efforts to secure justice, as though their object was to "obtain money as the price of blood." These are your words, sir. And is there any "decency or propriety" in volunteering such calumny in the position occupied by you just at this crisis? Whatever may be your private sentiments on this subject, to which you have a perfect right, it is amazing that judicious friends should not restrain you from going on in this suicidal manner. I understand that some of the Directors were advised by the President of an influential Company, to set aside a considerable amount of money, and to compromise, privately, all pecuniary claims. But this counsel was not followed. Your Letter, however, condescends to admit that a "gratuity" may,

in certain cases, be properly tendered. Sir, the sufferers, in this calamity, ask of you no "gratuities." Their object is not your "dimes" and dollars, but the just maintenance of their own rights, and the protection of the lives of their fellow-citizens. An appeal addressed to the Treasury of your Corporation in the name of law, and not "gratuity," appears the most effectual method of securing these ends. Rely upon it, sir, your Company has nothing so much to dread as the administration of justice by the tribunals of the land.

You conclude with expressing the hope that your Letter "may not be considered arrogant or defiant." No, Commodore; it is too humiliating to be "arrogant," and too harmless to be "defiant."

I am, with consideration,

Your fellow-citizen of New Jersey,

C. VAN RENSSELAER.

TO THE REV. C. VAN RENSSELAER, D.D.

PHILADELPHIA, Oct. 16, 1855.

On my way to this city, in the cars, I read your letter published in this morning's Ledger.

You seem to have forgotten that in the outset I positively repudiated the idea that you had not a perfect right, with all other citizens, to write or say what you might see fit, in regard to the management of railroads. My language is this:—"If you had confined your remarks to the management of the Board, however harsh or unworthy of a Christian minister they might have been, I should not have deemed it a duty incumbent on me to make any reply. But you have accused us of 'want of feeling upon the occasion, of unnatural indifference, of a more than Indian stoicism.'"

You have utterly abandoned the only point which I made or intended to make against you, by the admission contained in the following words: "*I never intended to impeach the private sympathies and sorrows of yourself, or of your associates.*" You have seen fit, however, before you got to the end of your letter, to contradict yourself. You not only reiterated what you said in relation to me as a Director, but you have done so in the most offensive manner. After expressing your opinion of the enormity of the offence of not expressing sympathy in the Report, you say: "Why then, my dear sir, did you advocate the erasure, as is reported, of the few words of sympathy that might have been the redeeming trait of the document?" I have no time to-day for anything more than to inform you, that you have in this again departed from the proprieties of a gentleman, by slandering and misrepresenting me anew. There is, and has been no foundation in fact for any such statement. It is a fabrication, entirely destitute of truth in all its length and breadth, and height and depth—in the aggregate and in the detail.

I am surprised that a gentleman having any regard for veracity should not, before hazarding such an assertion, have taken some pains to ascertain its truth. It is no justification for retailing a falsehood to say, in apology, that "*it was reported.*" On the strength of false reports, any man's reputation may be blasted. The wretch who circulates counterfeit money is equally guilty with the culprit who manufactures it; and he who gives currency to a falsehood, and, for his own purposes, uses it to the injury of another, must expect to have his reputation for veracity confounded with that of the original fabricator.

You speak of my making "a *pusillanimous* attempt to excite prejudice against the clergy."

Do you claim for yourself and clerical friends an immunity from all retorts, even from those persons whose reputation you have sought to tarnish by such unworthy means? Cannot your *slanders be repelled* without your claiming the benefit of clergy? Have you a license by virtue of your profession to excite prejudice against and defame individuals, and are they adjudged to silence? Ecclesiastical influence and arrogance have hardly attained this extent in the United States, nor need we

fear that they ever will, if you and your clerical friends continue to exhibit such a temper and spirit as manifested in your recent productions. Let the public decide which is the most "pusillanimous"—for *me* frankly to defend myself and friends from your unworthy and false aspersions, or for *you*, after unmeasured abuse and vituperation of worthy men, to endeavor to shelter yourself from responsibility, by taking refuge under the inviolability of your sacred profession.

In writing to a person so industrious in hunting up falsehoods, and attributing bad motives, it seems to be proper that I should make this additional remark—I have an habitual respect for all clergymen whose practice corresponds with their profession. It is not the clergy that I write against, it is only those who violate the sanctity of their office, by making it instrumental in casting unjust odium upon their fellow-citizens.

With high consideration, your ob't servant,

R. F. STOCKTON.

TO COMMODORE R. F. STOCKTON.

BURLINGTON, N. J., Oct. 18th, 1855.

DEAR SIR:—I understand that you came to Philadelphia on Tuesday last—perhaps in the hope of receiving congratulations. Or, perhaps, the lawyers of the Company telegraphed to Princeton, in order to control the hallucinations of the Director, before a writ could be issued *de lunatico inquirendo*.

Whilst you waived, in the language you quote, a reply to any strictures upon the regulations of the Company, on the ground that you did not deem it "a duty incumbent" upon you, the whole spirit of your first letter was in strong condemnation of the clergy's saying or doing anything about these matters. I am glad to have brought out from you, publicly and distinctly, the admission,—which your first letter was understood by many to deny—that the clergy may criticise the affairs of your Company, subject to the same responsibilities as other citizens. In continuing, however, to give us lectures, and in volunteering the office of a bishop, I beg leave to doubt whether you have a divine right to intrude into apostolic functions.

The current rumour, that you had advocated the erasure of a few words of sympathy in the Report, I regret having alluded to. But it did not particularly affect your character for the worse. Although there is some, is there a very great difference between striking out what was in the original draft, and studiously avoiding to put one word of sympathy in? If you think the *erasure* a "calumny," and exhibit so much warmth about it, is it not extraordinary that you should so coolly and deliberately vindicate the *omission*? It looks very much like a trick of the lawyers to raise a side issue.

You are among the last men, sir, who ought to complain before the public of severe language from an opponent. You appear to be unable to appreciate the difference between calling hard names, and dealing in hard things. Whilst abuse glances off into the air, keen truth pierces to the bones. I am not belligerent, believe me, sir; although, perhaps, you may think me like the non-combative Quaker, who was opposed to taking life, but who thought it no great harm to let a considerable stick of timber fall on the head of his adversary.

You state that in my Letter I admit everything about your private sympathies that I denied in my Review. My Review, however, made no private allusions. It noticed the Directors in their public capacity, and was distinctly the review of the Report of a Corporation. As such, it contained no remarks on your private character; and even in reference to your public character, it attempted to apologize for your conduct on the common maxim that "Corporations have no souls"—the only principle that can ever be your vindication.

Two things are now brought distinctly to view by our correspondence. In the first place, the public at large, who may not have read the long official document, have been made acquainted with the fact, that the Company's Report, in giving an official account of one of the most awful disasters that ever occurred in this country

(which Report was "ordered to be printed"), contained not a word of sympathy with the victims and sufferers on that dreadful occasion. And in the second place, it is now distinctly avowed, that the reasons for omitting the expression of sympathy, usually required by the "decencies and proprieties among civilized and Christian men," were entirely *prudential* ones. You do not yet seem to be aware, however, of the shock given to the community by the publication of the Report. Many of the mourners renewed their tears over the harsh and unnatural treatment of the Directors, with a bitterness somewhat relieved by the hope of its being accidental. Will their sorrow be the less now that you have publicly informed them that the Directors did the thing coolly and deliberately, and from motives of the most unappreciating and unmanly calculation?

Sir, your Company is in a most serious position at the present time. They have incurred already the condemnation of two juries, one of whom has indicted an engineer for the crime of manslaughter. The decisions of other juries will follow; and, if the facts of the case are weighed with the same care that they have been by Burlington County juries, the Company will begin to learn wisdom. In fact, all the railroads in the country are suffering, in various incidental ways, from the bad management of the New Jersey single track. People are beginning to get afraid to invest their funds in railroads, or to ride on them, or to be associated in their directorship, especially when public developments are impressing upon them the conviction that the chief managers of some companies are destitute of the common sense and practical skill which are the only basis of confidence.

The people, sir, will not be satisfied, until they get a double track. The only question is, whether the Company will undertake the work voluntarily, or whether legal compulsion shall intervene. A single track, especially as now managed, is a very dangerous concern. It is true that, at all the railroad crossings in the State, there are large sign-boards, on which are painted: "*Look out for the Locomotive!*" But, in juxtaposition with these amiable sentinels, there ought to be erected, all along the course, the adverse warning of an imperilled community: "*LOOK OUT FOR THE PEOPLE!*" According to the Company's Report, the people are admonished to stay at home, as the best preservative against accidents. "Had Dr. Heineken been at home, there would have been no accident." Now, inasmuch as you have stated that some of the railroad Directors, or their families, are riding in the cars every day, perhaps, upon reconsideration, you may grant to the New Jersey farmers the privilege of stirring from home without the responsibility of necessitating accidents.

The object of your coming before the public is sufficiently discerned. It was undoubtedly for the purpose of effecting an escape, if possible, from the condemnation incurred by issuing the unfeeling Report of September 10th. Like the Russian General, Gortschakoff, who, in order to avoid pursuit and capture, went to work *springing mines*, so the Commodore has sought to make a noise, in the vain hope of drawing off the attention of a watchful public. The Russian manœuvre cannot be repeated at so short an interval. The point to which you must be held face to face, at least, for the present, is the great catastrophe which has spread lamentation and fear throughout the land. This catastrophe was brought about (so think two Burlington juries, and great multitudes besides) by a system of mismanagement which the Company still refuse to correct, although the occurrence of another dreadful accident has recently been on the verge of consummation. First, sir, the Company must undergo a series of judicial investigations; and after that, or simultaneously with it, the people will insist upon the laying down of a double track. This is the people's plan of the campaign.

I am, in the rights of citizenship, your fellow-Jerseyman.

C. VAN RENSSELAER.